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PRESENT DAY LABOR LITIGATION
After classification of part of the field of labor litigation,1 it is well
to pause at this point and to analyze in more detail the manner in which
basic principles have been applied. In the original premise of this
series of comments it was asserted that most cases of labor disputes
involve the determination of two rights; (I) the right that no one shall
interfere with contractual relations; (2) the right to a free flow of
labor and goods. The first right will form the theme for later discus-
sions. It is the second right which is now to be examined more closely
in relation to the various cases thus far cited.
That this right to a free flow of labor and goods is not an absolute
right has been previously illustrated in some detail. It is simply the
statement of a general rule, and like most general rules it is subject to
See COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 280, 4o4.
[so]
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a number of limitations and qualifications.2 For example: while the
employee C (non-union) is entitled to a free flow of labor and goods
(i. e. has a right that his employment by B should not be interfered with
by third persons), yet the A (union) employees of B may strike against
B and compel the discharge of C.3 The effect of such a doctrine is
to justify interference with the free flow of labor and goods, such inter-
ference being permitted if the court finds that it has an approved object.
It is now to be determined whether these rules have been logically and
properly applied in the various situations that have arisen in labor liti-
gations.
There is a tendency to distinguish between strikes and boycotts in
applying the rules now considered.4 Is there any fundamental differ-
ence? Previously in this discussion a boycott has been treated as an
incident to a strike; but it is believed that an analysis of the actual sit-
uation will show that a strike is merely one form of a boycott. A boy-
cbtt has been defined as "a combining to withold or prevent dealings or
social intercourse with a tradesman, employer, etc.; social and business
interdiction for the purpose of coercion." 5  It is thus seen that as soon
as labor or patronage is withheld, a boycott exists. ' And it becomes at
once apparent that the boycott represents the general field, while a
strike is but one part of it. It may be that different rules are necessary
and that a strike should be treated differently from other forms of boy-
cott, but it is well to bear in mind their fundamental similarity. Essen-
"The right to the free flow of labor is not an absolute right; it is limited
by the right of employees to combine for purposes which in the eye of the law
justify interference with the plaintiffs' right to a free flow of labor." Haverhill
Strand Theatre v. Gillen (1918) 229 Mass. 413, 118 N. E. 671.
'Kemp v. Division No. 241 (1912) 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389.
"It is a matter of general information that "secondary boycotts" are illegal
even though the meaning of that expression is somewhat vague and uncertain.
It is probably safe to assert that many of the people who use it fail to inquire as
to whether there may be a "secondary strike" in like manner, and whether the
two have any fundamental points in common. This has doubtless been respon-
sible for a great deal of the confusion now existing in law as to labor litigation,
and particularly so as to those matters in which the legislatures have taken action.
'Webster's Dictionary. The word "boycott," naturally, has had various
judicial interpretations, but in general the courts have followed the above defini-
tion, except that there is a tendency to restrict it to mean a withholding of
business intercourse alone, rather than a withholding of labor.
'The reason why a boycott is generally treated as an incident to a strike seems
to be due to historical reasons rather than to a logical classification. It will
be remembered that a condition involving a strike was first reported in the early
part of the eighteenth century. A boycott, on the other hand, was of much
later origin, the first American case being that of State v. Glidden (1887) 55
Conn. 46, 8 At]. 89a [see Consolidated Steel and Wire Co. v. Murray (I897, C. C.
N. D. Ohio) 8o Fed. 8i], in which the court explained the situation which gave
rise to the-term. Consequently it was but natural to consider a boycott as one
means of making a strike more effective. There was first- a cessation of work
and later this was augmented by a cessation of business relations of all kinds,
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tially there can be no difference, for in any case it is a passive remedy-
it is simply a refusal to do that which those who are striking or boy-
cotting are not under a legal duty to do, namely, work or trade.
With reference to the simplest form of strike or other boycott the
decisions are well in accord. It is now generally accepted that a prim-
ary strike or boycott is legal.7  Here there are but two parties involved.
To hold such action illegal would be to hold that it is unlawful for
several to do that which it is lawful for each to do individually.
8 Does
this situation violate the right to a free flow of labor and goods? It
is to be observed that A is not obstructing labor or goods coming to B
from someone else. A is simply withholding his own labor or pur-
chases. A has the power to offer his labor, his money, or his goods to
B; and B has merely the beneficial liability that such an offer will be
made. When it is said that B has a right to a free flow of labor and
goods, it is meant that he has rights in rem that a third person shall
not impair the value of his beneficial liability by inducing A not to exer-
cise his power to make and accept offers-that is, not to deal with B.
B, however, has no rights as against A that A shall continue to deal
with him. So at best, the only complaint that B can make is that A
acted "maliciously," a fact which is not only difficult to prove and of
infrequent occurrence, but which indeed is not today generally recog-
nized as a tort.
When, however, we leave the realm, of a primary strike or boycott,
the courts differ widely in their decisions. Thus, to use again our illus-
tration, the A employees strike against their employer B to compel him
to discharge C, a non-union fellow employee. Or another situation is
that in which A refuses to deal with B (tradesman) unless B dis-
charges C, a non-union employee.9  We now have the presence of a
third person to further complicate matters. In these cases, as in the
case of the primary strike or boycott, we must determine the extent of
the application of the doctrine of the right to a free flow of labor and
goods. As between A and B it still remains a primary strike or boy-
cott, for, as discussed before, B, as against A, never had the right to
A's labor or trade. And since A always seeks to compel B to do or
refrain from doing something, in principle it is immaterial, so far as A
and B are concerned, that it should involve, as in this case, the discharge
both by the employees themselves and also by their sympathizers. What could
be more natural than to consider a strike as the primary factor? The average
person today probably makes this same distinction.
" Thus the A employees may strike against their employer B for increased pay,
shorter hours, etc., or they may refuse to deal with a tradesman B because his
scale of prices is too high. Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Drscoll (zo7) 2oo Mass.
zio, 85 N. E. 897.
See (I920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 8O9.
'It seems as though this might logically be called a secondary strike or boycott,
but those terms according to accepted usage have a somewhat different meaning,
as will be shown later.
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of C. A may demand that B refuse to buy from D, or that he discharge
C, or put into effect an eight hour day, etc., and unless A resorts to
improper means such as force or fraud, B practically never has a cause
of action, for in all such cases it amounts to only one thing-a strike or
threat to strike unless B forbears to exercise some privilege, and it is
immaterial as between the two, just what that privilege may be. As to
C, however, we have a different situation. There is, in the case of C,
an actual obstruction of the free flow of C's labor, by a third person
(A) ; in other words an interference with C's prospect of continued
employment by B. B wishes to continue C in his employment, but is
compelled to discharge him because of economic pressure brought to
bear on him by A. As between A and C this seems to be prima facie
an unwarranted interference with C's rights, even though A uses means
which are often legal (i. e. a strike). Thus we have the general rule
that an interference with the right to a free flow of labor or goods by a
third party is prima facie tortious, but may be excused if for a justi-
fiable object.10 The manner of deciding as to whether or not A has a
justifiable object and is thus excepted from the general rule of liability,
and a classification of these excepted cases will be found in the first
comment in this series."
A third situation is that in which A, striking against B, induces D,
an outsider, by means of labor trouble or loss of trade, or threats
thereof, to refuse to deal with B. This is what is generally called a
"secondary boycott.' 2 The cases that arise out of a state of facts of
"°It is submitted that the right to a free flow of labor and goods is but one
of the incidents included in the legal interest of one who conducts a lawful busi-
ness. Many courts hold that any interference with the business of another,
unless justified, is a violation of a property right. King v. Weiss & Lesh Mfg.
Co. (192o, C. C. A. 6th) 266 Fed. 257. Consequently the motive becomes the
important factor in the class of disputes. Tuttle v. Buck (igog) io7 Minn. 145,
iig N. W. 946. Possibly these instances indicate that our law is tending towards
the rule that in general any wilful interference with another, that causes
harm to that other, will amount to an actionable tort.
It is to be remembered, however, that even though this doctrine of justifica-
tion in labor litigation may at first thought seem to support the theory that an
act ordinarily privileged is actionable if it is done with a wrong motive and
causes harm, still that is not the situation as yet. Strikes and boycotts were
originally, and still are, tortious per se, certainly as against third persons.
Consequently these cases can merely hold that certain acts, heretofore illegal,
are now to be declared legal if the motive is justified. This does not make
strikes or boycotts legal per se, and so it would be erroneous to state that it is
the exercise of a privilege which becomes a tort only if done with a bad motive.
11 COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 280.12 In Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering (92) 41 Sup. Ct. 172, a secondary boycott
is defined as "a combination not merely to refrain from dealing with complainant,
or to advise or by peaceful means persuade complainant's customers to refrain
('primary boycott'), but to exercise coercive pressure upon such customers,
actual or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw patronage
from complainant through fear of loss or damage to themselves should they deal
with it."
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this kind, usually have as their object an injunction against A to restrain
him from bringing pressure to bear on B in this manner, or else the
collection of damages for harm caused to B by such pressure. It is for
this reason that this situation is classified as a "means"; for it is not
the original strike (A against B) against which relief is sought, but the
indirect means used by the parties to the strike to promote their pur-
poses-the dragging in of outsiders by A as a means of coercing B.'
s
If the E employees of D were to strike without any compulsion by A,
then there would simply be two separate strikes, each to undergo the
test of justification. But when the situation is such that A is in a posi-
tion to call out E, the courts say at once that it is a secondary boycott
and illegal for A to do so. Here it will be noticed that A is interfering
with B's right to a free flow of labbr and goods from D. A cannot be
enjoined from withholding his own labor, but as soon as he compels D
to withhold commerce from B, A is in the position of an interfering
third person, and his action requires justification. It is not the purpose
of the present discussion to suggest that this is or is not a justifiable
object; it is sufficient to point out that practically all the courts declare
it to be illegal. But it is interesting to note that there are at least three
jurisdictions that have lately sanctioned a secondary boycott
14
A complicating feature in present day labor litigation is the fact
that the unions are gradually combining into confederated groups0
s
Manifestly the power of such a group is enormous. Thus the leaders in
control of such federation may declare several distinct strikes in order
to coerce one particular employer. 'The general tendency appears to
treat each local union, party to a strike, as a separate unit, and. to hold
that the interest common to the members of the federation as a whole
is-not sufficient to excuse acts not otherwise justifiable. Where a fed-
eration attempts to put into effect a general boycott, it will usually be
restrained.18
When the situation is thus analyzed we find that strikes or -boycotts
can be grouped under three heads: (i) A strikes against B for better
working conditions ;17 (2) A strikes against B to compel him to cease
Commrrs (1g2i) 3o YAI= LAw JoURNAT, 404. This is the situation that
seems to be involved in Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, supra, The dissenting
opinion in that case.seems to take the view that there was no coercion as between
A and E.
"
4Pierce v. Stablemen's Union (igo9) 156 Calif. 70, 103 Pac. 324. Empire
Theatre Co. v. Cloke (1917) 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. io7; cf. Meier v. Speer
(igio) 96 Ark. 6x8, x32 S. W. 988.
See F. H. Cooke, Solidarity of Interest as Basis of Legality of Boycotting
(igo2) xx YALE LAw JouRNAL, 153.
" In a controversy of this kind both strikes and boycotts of trade are employed.
A federation may boycott B, and in so doing use a strike as well as other
means. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. (9Hl) 221 U. S. 418, 3X Sup. Ct.
492.
, A "sympathetic" strike is a peculiar situation and can perhaps be classified
best under this head. An illustration of such a strike is where there is a strike
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employing C, or to cease dealing with C; and (3) A, striking against
B, compels D, by threats of strike or boycott, to cease dealing with B.
Strikes falling within the first group are generally held to be lawful;
those in the second group require justification; and those in the third
group constitute illegal means and are generally held to be unlawful.
The recent decisions show important tendencies in the last two classes.
The courts are gradually extending the scope of a justifiable object.
Indeed there is no certain criterion as to what constitutes justifiable
trade competition and where the logical stopping point should be.'8
This must necessarily vary according to the mores of the time. It may
be that in the past few years, due to peculiar industrial conditions, the
pendulum has been swinging in the direction of the labor unions and is
now about to swing back. Yet there are some who think it has not
swung far enough. Surely we can expect the decisions to become more
nearly uniform and can hope that the question of what constitutes ajustifiable object, will be rendered more certain. Whatever conduct will
be permitted, will of course operate to limit the doctrine of the right to
a free flow of labor and goods.19
MUTUAL ASSENT AS AFFECTED BY UNILATERAL MISTAKE
The interesting, though by no means new, question as to whether a
contract comes into existence when an offer made by mistake is in terms
accepted, was raised in the recent case of Independent Trading Co. v.
on ,the B railroad and then the employees .of the D railroad go out on strike,
merely to bring moral pressure to bear on B. Naturally, if, we apply the tests
suggested in this series of comments, there is no cause of action against such
strikers, unless it appear that the employees of D were by reason of affiliation
or otherwise acting under compulsion rather than as free agents in declaring
their strike. A situation in which E strikes against D to compel D not to trade
with B (whose employees A are on strike) has sometimes been called a sympa-
thetic strike. See Darling, Recent American Decisions and English Legislation
Affecting Labor Unions (1908) 42 Am. L. REV. 2oo. But such a situation falls
within class 2.
' This is simply a question of degree. Mr. Justice Holmes has stated that most
differences are only of degree, when nicely analyzed. Rideout v. Knox (I889)
148 Mass. 268, 372, ig N. E. 390, 392.
"It is possible, too, that the courts will extend a remedy to certain groups,
which at the present time have no remedy. Thus A may strike against his
employer B to have C discharged. Let us suppose that this occurs in a jurisdic-
tion in which C is given a cause of action against A. Smith v. Boweli (igig) 232
Mass. io6, 121 N. E. 814. Then if A causes interference with C, C may sue A.
But suppose that B chooses to retain C, why should he not have an action againstA? Obviously A is committing a tort against C and it seems that in logic B
should be given a remedy in case he suffers harm by resisting A's demands.
Take the example of a secondary boycott: A compels D to cease dealing with
B. B can restrain such action by A. But suppose D refuses to stop dealing
with B, and sues A for interfering? Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated
Union (1905) I65 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 877. It is true that few cases come up in this
manner, but this may be due to the fact that it is generally recognized that the
courts would not grant relief.
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Fougera & Co. In that case the plaintiff, over the telephone, 
asked
the defendant for a quotation on ioo pounds of "potassium 
guaiacol
"sulphonate, C. P. white," which had been quoted to him on the same
day by several dealers at $30 a pound. Defendant's manager asked for
ten minutes' time and said he would call back. This he did; he 
told the
plaintiff the price was $1o.5o per pound. Plaintiff told defendant that
he would take ioo pounds, to which defendant's manager replied:
"Send around your contracts." A writing was sent, on which defend-
ant's agent wrote as follows: "Accepted, E. Fougera & Co., 
by
L. Jacobs."
The article designated in plaintiff's request for quotation was in the
form of perfectly white crystals and was worth $3o per pound, but
defendant's agent in accepting thought he was asked for the price of,
and meant to give the price of, the calcine or powder form of the arti-
cle, which contained exactly the same chemical ingredients and was
worth about $io per pound. The article designated by the plaintiff
was known to the defendant's agent as "thiocol." Defendant offered
to furnish the calcine form of the article, which plaintiff refused to
accept; and the defendant refused to supply the higher priced article.
In an action for damages for refusal to supply the latter article, it was
held that the plaintiff should recover, on the ground that there was no
evidence that there was any mutual mistake of the parties. Greenbaum
and Smith, JJ., dissented on the ground that plaintiff knew, or ought to
have known, that the defendant did not intend to offer to sell the article
worth $30 per pound.
The making of an offer creates a legal power in 
the offeree.2
Whether certain acts operate as an offer and create such a power
depends upon the reasonable interpretation of these acts. It does not
depend upon the secret intent of the person doing the acts. If they
have reasonably created the impression that he is willing to assume a
particular legal duty, the offeree has a power to create such a duty by
acceptance. This is the law because it accords with the prevailing
notions of justice and public policy, the mores of society. Not only is
the existence of a power of acceptance thus determined; the content
and limitations of the power are determined by the same standard.
3 At
present society simply asks: Did the acts of the offeror lead the
offeree reasonably to believe that he could impose (or what is the same
thing, that the offeror was willing to assume) the particular duty in
question, at the time of the acceptance? If such acts did reasonably
lead the offeree so to believe, society, because it believes that justice
I (g9o) 192 App. Div. 686, 183 N. Y. Supp. 431.
'Corbin, Offer and Acceptance (917) 26 YALE LA w JOURNAL, 16, M73, 18I;
x Williston, Contracts (192o) 31.
"See Corbin, op. cit., at p. 183: "The rules of contracts, like all other rules of
lw, are based upon mere matters of policy, or belief as to policy." American
Water Softener Co. v. United States (915) 5o Ct. CI. 2o9; Mansfield v. Hodgdon
(1888) 147 Mass. 304, 17 N. E. 544 (specific performance decreed).
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requires it, decrees the existence of the power. 4 In the principal case
an offer was in fact made and there was a power, and the question was
as to its character and extent. The offeree could impose a duty to
deliver some article; but what article? Manifestly, this is a question
of fact ;5 and it is to be answered by applying the standard of the rea-
sonably prudent man placed under the same, or similar, circumstances.
The article that such a man would have believed he was being offered
is the article that the defendant is under a duty to deliver.6
Tested by these considerations, what should have been the result in
the principal case?
The defendant's language, literally construed, was an offer to sell
ioo pounds of "potassium guaiacol sulphonate, C. P. white" at $10.50
per pound. If a reasonable man, situated as plaintiff was, would have
believed that the defendant was willing to assume a duty to deliver
the chemical worth $30 a pound for the price of $10.50 per pound, then
the plaintiff had a power to impose upon the defendant a duty to deliver
that chemical at that price; otherwise not. A jury should have been
required to ascertain whether a reasonable basis for such belief
existed.7
It will be observed that this test does not make the offer dependent
upon the secret intent of the offeror. The law relating to offer in con-
tract looks at the acts of the offeror and considers the impression which
these acts should reasonably make upon the mind of the offeree under
the existent circumstances. The offeror's words will not, of course,
be literally or technically construed, unless such literal or technical
construction would be the reasonable one under the circumstances."
The circumstances include the knowledge which the offeree has, or
ought to have.9
'Carnegie Steel Co. v. Connelly (1916, Sup. Ct.) 89 N. J. L. 1, 97 Atl. 774;Etbry v. Hargadine Dry Goods Co. (1907) 127 Mo. App. 383, l05 S. W. 777;Phillips v. Gallant (1875) 62 N. Y. 256, 264.
'Parker v. South Eastern Ry. (1875) L. R. 2 C. P. 416, 423, 426.
'Anson, Contract (Corbin's ed. igig) 32, note. Parker v. South Eastern Ry.
supra, at pp. 423, 425; Cargill Commission Co. v. Mowery (1i96) 99 Kan. 389,16i Pac. 634; Taplin & Rowell v. Clark (1915) 89 Vt. 226, 95 Att. 491; Rupley
v. Daggett (1874) 74 Ill. 351; Tyra v. Cheney (1gr5) i29 Minn. 428, z52 N. W.825; Grant Marble Co. v. Abbot (igia) 142 Wis. 279, 124 N. W. 264 (rescissiondenied); Coates & Sons v. Buck (1896) 93 Wis. 128; 67 N. W. 23.7If the jury should find that the plaintiff was not reasonable in believing thatthe defendant was offering the crystalline form of the chemical, but that thereasonable belief was that the calcine or powdered form was offered, instead ofthe plaintiff's having a right to delivery of the crystalline form, he would be
under a*duty to take the powder form. Parker v. South Eastern Ry., supra note5; Neill v. Midland (869, Ch.) 2o L. T. 864, 17 W. R. 871; Buck v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soo. (1917) 96 Wash. 683, 165 Pac. 878.
8 Corbin, op. cit. note 2, at p. 177.
Anson, Contract (Corbin's ed. igig) 213, note 2. Goddard v. Jeffreys (1882,Ch.) 45 L. T. 74, 30 W. R. 270; Neill v. Midland Ry., supra note 7; Buck v.Equitable Life Assur. Soc., supra note 7.
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It has often been recognized by courts of equity in similar cases,
where there were otherwise the usual grounds to decree specific per-
formance, that it was very hard and unconscionable to insist on the
performance of a contract, even though the words of the parties
taken out of their setting, namely, all the surrounding circumstances,
indicated a meeting of the minds. In such cases, equity has often
remitted the parties to such remedies as the law would give, on the
ground that specifically enforcing the bargain would be harsh.
Such a case was Webster v. Cecil.10 Webster first offered Cecil
£2,000 for certain parcels of land, the offer being refused. Cecil later
wrote making an offer to sell the land for £i,ioo, which Webster
accepted by return mail. Cecil meant to offer the land for £2,IOO, but
made an error in adding the valuations he had put on the parcels separ-
ately. This error he attempted to correct as soon as he discovered it.
Specific performance was refused on the ground that the mistake had
been clearly proved; and the plaintiff was remitted to such action as
he might be advised to bring at law.11
Some courts, however, have even gone so far as to grant equitable
relief where, according to accepted theories, there was a valid contract.
Thus, in St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp,12 where a builder had sub-
" (I86r,Ch.) 30 Beav. 62.
'It seems that a more substantial basis for refusing the relief asked in this
case would have been that there was no contract to be enforced. On this
ground likewise damages would not be recoverable at law. It is interesting to
speculate as to why the equity courts, until recent times, rather consis-
tently fail to avail themselves of this apparently more solid ground upon which
to deny reli' f in such cases. It may be that, because the law relating to offer
and acceptance is of comparatively recent development, this ground for denying
relief, if "more solid," was less obvious to courts of equity seventy-five years
ago than now. Or it may be that in the earlier cases equity was but tacitly
acknowledging that its adjudication that no contract existed would not make
that fact res adjudicata so as to prevent an action at law. In either event
the later cases have somewhat blindly followed the practice in the earlier. For
similar cases denying equitable relief and remitting to legal remedies, see Chute
v. Quincy (892) i56 Mass. 189, 30 N. E. 550; Mansfield v. Sherman (188g) 81
Me. 365, 17 AtI. 300; Burkhalter v. Jones (1884) 32 KarL. 5, 3 Pac. 559. In the
latter case the court, at page 13, used this language: "In strict law, and by the
words of the letters of the parties, we think the parties made a contract; but
we also think that in fact and in equity the minds of. the parties never came
together; that they never really agreed to the same thing; and therefore in
equity and good conscience, they did not make a contract or at least they did not
make such a contract as equity should adjudge to be specifically enforced."
The writer does not maintain that specific performance should always be decreed
in cases similar to Webster v. Cecil, if there is a *contract for the breach of which
a court of law would give damages. But it is believed that, in this class of
cases, the number of instances where the plaintiff would recover damages, when
equity had refused him specific performance, would be surprisingly small.
22 (1916) 135 Minn. 115, 16o N. W. 500. See also Board of School Cov'rs v.
Bender (i9o4) 36 Ind. App. 164, 72 N. E. i54; contra, Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel
(907) 226 Ill 9, 8o N. E. 564. Specific performance, however, is very often
decreed where there is a unilateral mistake unknown to the other party; Goddard
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mitted a bid for the erection of a church, which had been accepted, it
was held that the fact, unknown to the church committee, that the
builder omitted to include in his estimate the structural steel for the
building, justified the court in releasing the bidder where the other
party had not materially changed its position, the bidder, as the court
said, being free from negligence resulting in the mistake.
One of the leading law cases on this subject is Smith v. Hughes.8
The plaintiff applied to defendant, a race horse trainer, to know if he
wanted to buy oats and, receiving a reply that he was always ready to
buy good oats, exhibited a sample and stated that he had 4o or 50
quarters of the same oats to sell at 35s per quarter. Defendant took
the sample and wrote the next day that he would take the whole
quantity at 34s per quarter. Plaintiff sent some of the oats, which
were refused because they were not old oats. The parties had not in
terms mentioned old oats; but the price offered was high for new
oats, and more than a prudent man would have given. Plaintiff knew
defendant was a race horse trainer, but was not aware of the fact that
such trainers never used new oats if old could be had. In an action for
damages for refusal to take the oats, it was held error to instruct
the jury that the plaintiff could not recover if plaintiff believed that
the defendant "believed or was under the impression that he was
"contracting for th e purchase of old oats."
Justice Cockburn based his opinion on the ground that "the passive
"acquiescence of the seller in the self-deception of the buyer will not
"entitle the latter to avoid the contract." Justice Blackburn said that
"there is no legal obligation on the vendor to inform the purchaser
"that he is under a mistake, not induced by the act of the vendor ;" and
that the direction did not call attention to "the distinction between
"agreeing to take the oats under the belief that they were old, and
"agreeing to take the oats under a belief that the plaintiff contracted
"that they were old." Only in the latter case, he thought, should the
defendant recover. Hannen, J., said that the defendant should not have
judgment unless the jury find, "not merely that the plaintiff believed
"the defendant to believe that he was buying old oats, but that he
"believed the defendant to believe that he, the plaintiff, was contracting
"to sell old oats."
It seems to be assumed by all the judges that actual belief or knowl-
edge of the parties is controlling. It would seem more nearly correct
to say that the plaintiff's offer creates in the offeree a power to impose
such a duty on the offeror as a reasonably prudent man would believe
the offeror to have offered to assume.14 If such a man would have
v. Jeffreys, supra note 9; Phifllp v. Gallant, supra note 4; Mansfield v. Hodgdon,
supra note 3.
(1871) L. R. 6 Q. B. 597.
"See note 6, supra. In Tyra v. Cheney, where the acceptor had not induced
the mistake, Holt, J., said: "One cannot snap up an offer or bid knowing that
COMMENTS
understood reasonably from the very high price put on the oats, that
old oats were being offered, a power to create a duty to deliver such
oats should be held to have existed. The same conclusion should fol-
low from the mere offer to sell oats, if it is so well known that race
horse trainers use only old oats that a reasonably prudent man would
think that only old oats would be offered. What such a man would
understand determines what power is created, and the question is one
of fact.
In this case of the oats the defendant made a counter-offer. The
power he thus created is that which the jury finds would have been
understood by a reasohably prudent man under the circumstances,
among which are the very important facts that the oats were offered
to one who never buys new oats if old can be had,15 and at a price
which no prudent man would pay for new oats. The judges all seem
to assume that, so far as the existence of the defendant's belief that he
was originally offered old oats is concerned, the plaintiff has been pas-
sive, i. e., has done nothing to induce that belief. It seems clear that
this is incorrect in view of the facts above referred to, namely, putting
on of a price not reasonable for new oats and offering to sell to one
who generally is not in the market for such oats.
It seems questionable whether it is useful to attempt to apply the dis-
tinction suggested between a belief formed where the offerer is said to
be passive and one formed where the offeror is said to have induced it.'6
it was made in mistake." This simply means that the offeree does not acquire
that power which the offeror's language purports to confer on him, because he
has not sufficient reason to believe that the offeror is willing to assume the duty
indicated by his words. But see Southbridge Roofing Co. v. Providence Cornice
Co. (1916) 39 R- I. 35, 97 AtI. 210.
Whether the offeree, or a reasonably prudent man, would think that the
offer is to purchase only old oats when a sample has been shown and priced to
him with a view to sale, will be dependent, assuming of course no actual know-
ledge in the offeree, upon the generality of knowledge that race horse trainers
want only old oats if they can get them, and upon the scarcity in the market of
old oats. If old oats are known to be very scarce, the race horse trainer may not,
from the mere fact of offer, reasonably believe that the price named is for old
oats.
In Greene v. Bateman (1846, C. C. D. R. I.) Fed. Cas. No. 5762, Woodbury,
C. J., said: "If one agreed to $3.25 per bunch, and the other to $3.25 per thousand,
only half as high a price, there was in truth no contract, as it takes two, we all
know, both in fact and in law, to make a contract. Had nothing been said as to
bunches or thousands, and the sale was of shingles at $3.25, it might be presumed
that the parties meant per thousand, as it was shown to be usual to sell by the
thousand at Providence; and it surely would be so presumed if a knowledge of
this usage had been brought home to the plaintiff, or if he as well as the defen-
dant had resided at Providence, and thus been likely to know and conform to the
usage."
" Such cases would be extremely rare, if existent at all, for the reason that a
power, in the law of contract, cannot be created, an offer cannot be made, by
merely remaining passive. There must be human action.
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The question always is: What belief is reasonably induced, or ought
to be induced.1 7
The same test applies, after we have determined what power in the
offeree has been created, as to whether that power has been exercised.
Here, as in the case of the offer, the secret intent of the offeree does
not control, because, as we have seen, contracts are not made by, nor
are they consequent upon, actual intents and consents. If, under all
the existent circumstances, a reasonably prudent man would believe
that in acting the offeree was exercising the power created by the offer,
a contract results. Here again the question is one of fact.""
It is admitted that some of the older sales cases applying the doc-
trine of caveat emptor would not square with the view here main-
tamined. The fact, however, that many of those decisions shock our
sense of justice is one reason why we should cease to apply that doc-
trine in such cases. Where the application of that doctrine does not
seem harsh, thd above views as to the controlling considerations, views
applicable to contract relations in general, will, it is believed, explain
the decisions.
H. W. A.
TAXATION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
In the recent case of Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain
(1920, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. 45, the Supreme Court of the United States
dealt with a new application of the principles governing state taxation
of foreign corporations. A Connecticut statute levied a tax of two
per cent on that proportion of the "net income" of a foreign corporation
which the fair cash value of the tangible real and personal property
in the state bore to the fair cash value of all the corporate property.
A Delaware corporation, with its principal manufacturing plant in
Connecticut, contested the tax as unconstitutional and showed that by
this method of apportionment the tax was levied upon forty-seven per
cent of its net income, which was much more than the actual amount
of income derived from "business in Connecticut." The company's
net receipts, in other states were.over $I,oooooo and in Connecticut
only about $42,ooo; while under the method of apportionment fixed
by the statute a tax was levied on a sum in excess of $6ooooo. The
1TSee authorities cited in note 6, supra.
's In Johnson Fish Co. v. Hawley (1912) 15o Wis. 578, 582, 137 N. W. 773, 775,
referring to plaintiff's alleged acceptance, which was ambiguous and which had not
been treated as an acceptance, the court said: "If it be true that respondent did
not mean to convey such an idea; but used language leading Mr. Hawley, in the
exeriise of ordinary care, to suppose it did, it must bear the burden of its fault.
He had a right to act upon the meaning which respondent's words conveyed to
him, if such, reasonably, might be the meaning an ordinarily careful person would
read out of such language under the same or similar circumstances." See also
Vanleer v. Fain (1845, Tenn.) 6 Humph. 1o4; Kendall v. Boyer (19o9) r44
Iowa, 303, i=n N. W. 941; Clark v. Maisch (ipo, Wis.) 177 N. W. Ii.
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Supreme Court, sustaining the decision of the Connecticut supreme
court of errors,' declared the tax constitutional.
In taxing the property of foreign corporations the state legislatures
have often run into conflict with the Commerce Clause and the Four-
teenth Amendment of the federal Constitution. The difficulty has been
in allocating to the taxing jurisdiction a certain part of the total cor-
porate property or income or in finding some method of determining
its "true value" for purposes of taxation. A state may levy a tax
upon the intra-state business of a foreign corporation,2 or it may tax
its property situated within the state, but used in interstate commerce.3
But it is difficult to apply such general principles to specific cases.,
An excise tax based upon the entire capital stock or gross receipts of a
corporation doing business5 in the state has been held invalid 6 unless
there was a limit placed on the total amount of the tax thus levied,
although there would seem to be no fundamental reason for the dis-
tinction.7 It is evident from these decisions that some bona fide
attempt at apportionment is necessary and that a tax based upon the
entire corporate property, capital stock, or earnings will not be sus-
tained.
In fixing a basis of apportioning the corporate stock or income for
taxation the states have used various methods. The so-called "unit
of value" rule by which a tax was levied upon that proportion of the
capital stock which the length of the company's lines in the state bore
to the total mileage has been declared constitutional.8 But the unit
rule will not be applied when an unjust apportionment would result.9
1 (1919) 94 Conn. 47, io8 Ati. 154. The Supreme Court of the United States
cited with approval the following remarks of Justice Beach in answer to the
argument that the tax was based upon an unfair apportionment. "The Plaintiff's
argument . . . carries the burden of showing that 47 per cent of its net
income is not reasonably attributable, for purposes of taxation, to the manu-
facture of products from the sale of which 8o per cent of its gross earnings was
derived after paying manufacturing costs. Cf. Amer. Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis
(1918) 250 U. S. 459, 39 Sup. Ct. 522.
'Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. z. Richmond (1919) 249 U. S. 252, 39 Sup. Ct. 265.
'Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Adams (1895) 155 U. S. 688, 695, i5 Sup. Ct.
268, 269.
'See Beale, The Situs of Things (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 525, for a
general discussion of this subject and authorities cited.
'See infra p. 529.
'Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas (191o) 216 U. S. I, 30 Sup. Ct. i9o; Inter-
national Paper Co. v. Mass. (1918) 246 U. S. 135, 38 Sup. Ct 2; Looney v.
Crane (1917) 245 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 85; Galveston Ry. v. Texas (igo8) 21o
U. S. 217,:28 Sup. Ct. 638.
"Baltic Mining Co. v. Mass. (1913) 231 U. S. 68, 34 Sup. Ct 15. See Com-
MENTS (igi8) 2_7 YA Im LAw JOURNAL, 1074.
'Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor (1897) I65 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct.
6o4; Southeastern Ry. v. Arkansas (1914) 235 U. S. 350, '35 Sup. Ct 99.
' Wallace v. Hines (920, U. S.) 40 Sup. Ct 435. In this case the mileage method
gave to the property of the corporation in South Dakota an arbitrarily enhanced
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Likewise, where the tax was placed upon the corporate property, such
as cars travelling in and out of the state, and such number of all the
company's cars was taxed as the mileage in the state bore to the total
mileage, the court found that the property was arbitrarily valued too
high and held the tax invalid.10 So with a tax based upon the gross
receipts and measured by the proportion that the business done in the
state bears to the entire business." But a tax upon gross receipts from
business done in the state has been upheld when it was in lieu of all
other taxes, thus distinguishing it from the case last cited.U Taxes
upon the net income of non-residents derived from all property or
business carried on within the state have been sustained recently. 3
Thus it appears that state taxation will be sustained when a bona fide
attempt to estimate the "true value" or allocate the property has been
made and a just result reached. No distinction has been made between
a tax based upon capital stock, gross receipts, net income, gross busi-
ness, or tangible corporate property when properly apportioned. Nor
is there ground for distinction between a tax which is in effect an excise
tax and a tax upon corporate property, although the court would seem
to be more inclined to uphold the latter.14 Each case stands on its own
merits as to justice in the result. The court's decision in the principle
case, sustaining the tax on the ground that though most of the income
was Ireceived outside Connecticut it was received from manufacture
in Connecticut, is in harmony with 'principles previously announced.1 5
A MERE QUANTUM MERUIT FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES.
It may be true, in this country at least, that a lawyer is worthy of
his hire, but this does not mean that he is always to get what he thinks
value. The company had no terminals in that state and its road bed was con-
structed across plains at much smaller expense than in other states where the
nature of the country and the size and number of the cities made railroad build-
ing more costly. See Fargo v. Hart (19o4) I93 U. S. 49o, 24 Sup. Ct 498.
10 Union Tank Line v. Wright (19ig) 249 U. S. 275, 39 Sup. Ct. 276. See
COMMENTS (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 802.
' .Meyer v. Wells Fargo and Co. (1912) 223 U. S. 298, 32 Sup. Ct. 218.
12 U. S. Express Co. v. Minn. (912) 223 U. S. 335, 32 Sup. Ct. 211. Likewise
taxing gross earnings from car lines operated in the state, in lieu of all other
taxes, has been held constitutional. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minn. (918) 246
U. S. 450, 38 Sup. Ct 373.
" Travis v. Yale Towne Mfg. Co. (i92o, U. S.) 4a Sup. Ct. 228; Shaffer v.
Carter (192o, U. S., 4o Sup. Ct. 221 ; see Deganay v. Lederer (iI99) 250 U. S. 376,
39 Sup. Ct. 524.
' See U. S. Express Co. v. Minn. (1912) 223 U. S. 335, 344 ff., 32 Sup. Ct. 211,
214 ff.
"For a more complete discussion of this subject with the authorities collected
see Powell, Indirect Encroachment of Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers
of the States (1917-18) 31 HARv. L. REV. 321, 572, 721, 932; (1918-19) 32 id.
234, 374, 634, 902.
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his hire should be. He may recover in quantum meruit the "reason-
able value" of his services practically everywhere in the United States,'
but a series of recent cases has shown that there may nevertheless be
obstacles in his way of recovering a definite and agreed fee. If such
fee is contingent, it is, according to the Canons of Legal Ethics of the
American Bar Association, subject to the supervision of the court, in
order that the client may be protected from unjust charges.
2 Except
for this, the fee when fairly agreed upon is recoverable by a lawyer
who has completed the promised service.3 If the lawyer is in default,
he may by the better rule recover nothing.
4 If, however, he is ready
and willing to perform but is wrongfully discharged by his client, a
conflict of authority has developed. Probably the majority of cases
allow him in such case to recover his agreed fee,
5 but the minority
dissent has been reinforced by strong decisions in New York in
'Newman v. Washington (1827, Tenn.) Mart. & Y. 79; Costigan, Cases on
Legal Ethics (1917) 484; Adams v. Stevens (1841, N. Y.) 26 Wend. 451. In
New Jersey an express promise of a fee is necessary. Bentley v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. (I9o8) 75 N. J. L. 828, 89 Atl. 2o2, 127 Am. St. Rep. 841, note. See
also cases collected 6 C. J. 719; i Thornton, Attorneys at Law (1914) secs. 414,
487. As to the English rule contra, see note 19 infra. This was the early rule
in Pennsylvania, Mooney v. Lloyd (i8ig, Pa.) 5 S. & R. 412, later overruled in
Foster v. Jack (1835, Pa.) 4 Watts, 334.
'Canon 13. The Canons of Ethics are reprinted in each volume of Am. Bar.
Assn. Reports since Vol. 33 (except Vols. 35 and 36), also in Costigan, op. cit.,
at p. 570. While these canons are not statutes, they are given much weight in
such proceedings as those for the disciplining of lawyers: In re Morrison
(I92o, S. D.) 178 N. W. 732; People v. Berezniak (1920) 292 Ill. 305, 127 N. E:
36; (1920) 5 MINN. L. REv. 71. Courts have refused to enforce unconscionable
contingent fee contracts, but they hesitate to base such action on the size of the
fee alone. Taylor v. Bemiss (1884) 22O U. S. 42, 3 Sup. Ct. 441; 6 C. J. 741.
The Canons of Ethics seem not to have affected the situation. Ridge v. Healy
(1918, C. C. A. 8th) 251 Fed. 798, 804; In re D'Adamo's Estate (1916, Surro.)
94 Misc. I, 157 N. Y. Supp. 374; In re Meng (igg) 227 N. Y. 264, 125 N. E,
500.
'See references to cases collected in note i supra.
'Cases collected 6 C. J. 726; Thornton, op. cit., sec. 450; see also Mills v.
Metropolitan St. Ry. (192o, Mo.) 221 S. W. i.
'Dorshimer v. Herndon (915) 98 Neb. 4r21, 153 N. W. 496; Scheinesohn v.
Lenzonek (1911) 84 Oh. St. 424, 95 N. E. 913, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 737, note. See
also cases collected L. R. 1917 F, 406; 6 C. J. 734.
'Martin v. Camp (1916) 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46, L. R. A. 1917F, 402, note,
reversing (1914) 161 App. Div. 61o, 146 N. Y. Supp. 1O41. See criticism by
W. A. Estrich, Right to Discharge an Attorney (1918) 25 CASE AND COMMENT,
563; (1916) 30 HARv. L. REv. 183; 2 Williston, Contracts (292o) sec. 1029.
Cf. (1916) 26 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 153. The decision in the lower court
was approved in (1914) 28 HARV. L. REv. ioi and (914) 14 Coi. L. REv. 597.
Earlier cases in accord with Martin v. Camp are Louque v. Dejan (1911) 129
La. 519, 56 So. 427, 38 L R. A. (i. s.) 389, note; Polsley v. Anderson (1874)
7 W. Va. 202; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Semmes (89o) 73 Md. 9, 20 Atl. x27;
Parish v. McGowan (1912) 39 App. D. C. 184 (discharge before substantial
compliance). Cf. also Henry v. Vance (igoi) iir Ky. 72,'63 S. W. 273. As
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1916 and in Minnesota7 and South Dakota8 in 192o. Oregon, however,
has recently decided with the majority without noting the opposing
rule.9 The theory of what may perhaps be termed the New York rule,
in view of the general resort to Martin v. Camp ° as authority, is that
since the client has the "right" to discharge the lawyer at any time, the
exercise of that "right" is not to be followed by the same duty of paying
the agreed fee as though it had not been exercised.
It is proposed to examine this viewpoint, particularly since it has
been the subject of rather general criticism."' It may be admitted at
once that the onus is on those who support this rule to justify it on
some compelling reasons of policy, since it is at variance with the
ordinary rule of agency or employment. 2  Do such reasons of policy
exist?
the above cases show, this result seems more easily reached where the contract
is for a .contingent fee, 6 C. J. 725. See Ramey v. Graves (192o, Wash.)
191 Pac. 8oi. In Ennis v. Beers (1911) 84 Conn. 61o, 8o At. 772, only quantum
meruit was allowed- against a minor.
"Lawler v. Dunn (i92o, Minn.) 176 N. W. 989, two judges dissentin:; see
criticism, (192o) 4 MINN. L Rav. 44I, (i92o) 2o Co. L. Rav. 729.
'Ritz v. Carpenter (i92O, S. D.) 178 N. W. 877. Ramey v. Graves, supra
note 6, in accord, is rested upon the ground that the contract was for a
contingent fee.
'Dblph v. Speckart (I92O, Ore.) x86 Pac. 32 A note on this case in (192o)
2D Co. L Rav. 485 discusses another point. See also Teiser v. Barlow (1920,
Ore.) 192 Pac. 394, Allen v. Brooke (I92O, Ga.) xo2 S. E. 832, and dictum in
accord in Mills v. Metropolitan St. Ry., supra note 4, at p. 5.
"Supra note 6. ' See notes 6 and 7 supra.
"Though an attorney is an officer of the court, as between him and his
client the general rules of agent and principal apply. I Mechem, Law of Agency
(2d ed. 1914) sec. 2150. In the ordinary contract of employment, an employee
wrongfully discharged recovers his damages based upon the contract price less
such damages as he might have reasonably avoided. Williston, Contracts
(192o) secs. 1o28, 1358 ff. That the rule as to minimizing damages does not
ordinarily apply to attorneys who have not contracted to give a definite portion
of their time, see Dixon v. Volunteer Bank (913) 213 Mass. 345, 100 N. E.
65s; 6 C. J. 725. It is submitted that Professor Williston's criticism of
Martin v. Camp, supra note 6--"It is a fundamental principle of contracts
that both parties must be bound by the agreement"--states merely the logical
rule to be applied in the absence of any countervailing policy. He himself states
one exception-voidable promises-which is a much more inclusive class than
the example he suggests of minors, and he himself points out that relations
between attorney and client are subject to careful scrutiny, with the burden
upon the attorney to show the fairness of any dealings with his client. Willis-
ton, op. cit., secs. io29, 1627.' Even though he limits this rule to dealings after
the relation of attorney and client exists, he shows that his "fundamental" rule
has some gaps. Moreover, it is suggested that the same factors of more exten-
sive knowledge or means of knowledge on the attorney's part and confidence
on the client's part, at least to some 'extent exist at the formation of the
relation, so that it, too, should be subject to some scrutiny. The statements
in cases like Elmore v. Johnson (1892) 143 IIl. 513, 32 N. E. 413, that then the
parties deal with each other at arm's length seems too broad. Even from the
standpoint of logic alone it would seem that courts have power to control their
own officers.
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On these points the courts in the recent cases might 
well have been
more definite. They speak of an implied or inferred 
condition of the
contract and then rely upon the "right" of discharge, 
which does
suggest the policy involved, but, as the criticisms show, 
with not enough
clearness to convince.
13 Any person has the power "to break his
contract," i. e., to change the form of his duty to the 
plaintiff from one
based upon his promise to one based upon the remedial 
action of the
court. Where the courts will order specific performance, 
this. new
duty is not essentially different from his original duty, 
except that it
is more serious by reason of costs and damages. As 
courts will not
attempt to enforce specifically contracts of personal service,
14 it would
follow that in any such contract a party has power to substitute 
money
damages for performance. What the courts are really 
interested in
here is whether the termination is privileged, i. e., whether 
no duty to




It is stated by countless authorities as well settled that a client 
has.
the "right" to discharge his attorney and to substitute another 
at any
time with or without cause and in spite of any contract. The 
reason
of policy assigned is the necessity inherent in the relationship of absolute
confidence of the client in his attorney; when such confidence ends,
the relationship should end.
6 But under the majority rule above
stated, the courts say that a discharge without cause amounts to 
a
breach of contract, and the damages are measured by the contract
price.1 7 Hence the discharge of the lawyer, unless for justifiable
cause, would not be a defense to an action for the contract price. It
is difficult to see what is the practical utility of the "right" of substitu-
' See criticism of these cases on this point (I92Q) 29 Ymm LAw JouRNAL,
921. The flamboyant language in Ritz v. Carpenter, supra note 8, is subject to
the same criticism.
"It has been held that there is no room for the application of the rule 
of
Lumley v. Wagner (i85z, Ch.) i DeG. M. & G. 6o4, to a discharge by an employer,
and probably it is not applicable in any event to a contract for legal services.
See Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence ( 4th ed. i919) secs. 1712, 1713.
'See on this point Estrich, op. cit. note 6.
" "Indeed, the right of a client so to discharge his attorney is practically
indispensable in view of the delicate and confidential relations which exist
between attorney and client, and of evil to the client's interests, engendered
by friction or distrust." Thornton, op. cit, sec. 138, with cases collected. See
also 6 C. J. 676; cases in note z8 infra. So'also, as the client must have full
control of his case, an agreement that a suit -should not be settled without
the attorney's consent is void as against public policy. Matter of Snyder (1907)
1go N. Y. 66, 82 N. E. 742, 14 L R. A. (x. s.) lOI, note, i3 Ann. Cas. 441, note.
See also Ann. Cas. I913 D 306, note; 3 A. L ,. 472; Moran v. Simpson
(i919, N. D.) 173 N. W. 769; Sizon, V. Chicago etc. Ry. (I92o N. D.) I77 N. W.
iO7, overruling Greendeaf v. Minneapolis etc. Ry. (915) 3o N. D. ii2, 151 N. W.
879. The same policy is expressed by the cases holding that a testator cannot
force his executors to employ a particular attorney in settling his estate. Foster
v. Elsley (i88i) 19 Ch. D. s18: (1915) 28 HARV. L. REV. 530.
"" See note 5 supra.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
tion universally so carefully cherished by the courts, if the client is nobetter off than any party to a confract of personal service who desires to
terminate it. If a client must show legal cause in each case before
discharging his attorney or else pay the attorney whatever hIigh fee
may have been agreed upon as the price of success, then it is obvious
that the relationship will continue after the client has ceased to have
absolute confidence in "either the integrity or the judgment or the
"capacity of the attorney.""8  The New York rule is absolutely correct
in treating the "right to discharge" as a barren power if the contract
fee is nevertheless to be paid. If the New York rule is to be followed,
in all honesty the courts should cease their talk about the nature of the
relationship and its requirement of absolute confidence, since they are
according nothing more than is inhereht in any similar contract for
services.
It is submitted further that independent rules of policy justify the
New York rule. Under the English law a barrister may not recover
a fee by suit.' 9 Only a solicitor may so sue.2 0 It is then the ideal of
the legal system from which our law springs that the counselor-at-law
is not a hireling of the market, but is an officer of the court whose duty
it is to see that justice is done and who receives from those whom he
has protected such honorarium as their gratitude dictates.2' Such an
ideal may easily degenerate into a cloak for hypocrisy,22 and yet, as
many of our greatest lawyers have pointed out, there is something
fine in holding as an ideal of the profession the ministry of justice
rather than the making of money.23 In spite of sneers and jibes, we
know that the best lawyers in the country to-day faithfully serve such
an ideal. We may go further and say that none but the poor-
est grade of lawyer will sue for a fee except in case of great imposi-
tion.2- The ordinary dispute as to fees is settled without court action.
"'Cf. Gage v. Atwater (19o2) 136 Calif. 17o, 17-, 68 Pac. 581; Henry v. Vance,
supra note 6; Matter of Dunn (1912) 205 N. Y. 398, 98 N. E. 914.
"Kennedy v. Broun (i863, C. P.) 13 C. B. (x. s.) 677.
' Poucher v. Norman (1825, K. B.) 3 B. & C. 744.
The reasons of policy stated in Kennedy v. Broun, supra, have not met,
however, with complete approval. See Reg. v'. Doutre (i88, H. L.) L. R.
9 A. C. 745, 751; McDougall v. Campbell (1877) 41 U. C. Q. B. 332, 346, (Har-
rison, C. J. dissenting); Christen v. Lacoste (1893) Que. Q. B. 142, i47,
pointing out the similarity of the Roman, French, and English systems; 6 C. J.719; Thornton, op. cit., sec. 4oo ff. But see Cohen, The Law-Business or
Profession? (1919) 201 ff.
' Cf. cases in note 21, supra.
' On the English system of fees see quotations from Joseph H. Choate and
others collected in Costigan, op. cit. note i, at p. 481 if; Smith, Tustice and the
Poor (ig) 85, 86.
" See A. B. A. Canon 14: "Controversies with clients concerning compensa-
tion are to be avoided by the lawye- so far as shall be compatible with his
self-respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense for his services;
and lawsuits with clients concerning fees should be resorted to only to prevent
injustice, imposition or fraud."
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We may well look askance at a rule of law which will ordinarily be
resorted to only by the more offensive members of the bar.
A contract for an agreed fee by its very nature tends towards unfair-
ness. Lawyers' fees are difficult enough to *compute when all the
items, such as time involved, amount involved, and the result of the
litigation, are known. When substantially all factors of this kind are
undetermined, naturally the lawyer-the one party to the relation who
by his profession is familiar with the business in hand-will state a
fee sufficiently high to cover all contingencies. In Ritz v. Carpenter
(i92o, S. D.) 178 N. W. 877, plaintiff had been employed to defend
one accused of crime, and, according to his claim, after appearing at
the preliminary hearing for $250, agreed to appear at the trial for
$7,5oo.25 Moreover the fact that here the factors upon which fees are
ascertained are so uncertain will tend to foster contingent fee contracts,
the extortion and oppression of which have often been discussed.
26
In many of the cases adopting the New York rule, the same result
could have been reached by applying the provision of the Canons of
Ethics that the court should supervise contingent fees.
27 The provision
has not been as successful as might have been hoped,
28 and hence it
is wise that the courts have directly and conclusively taken control of
this particular problem.
The rule allowing only quantum meruit does not operate unfairly
to the attorney in actual practice, as anyone who has attempted to
contest attorneys' fees can testify. The attorney has all the advan-
tages in securing evidence to prove his case in any claim for the
reasonable value of his services, and the court or jury can be relied on
to take care of manifest unfairness upon the part of the client. If,
as stated in Ritz v. Carpenter, the jury may consider the agreed fee
in determining what would be such reasonable value, the lawyer is
fully protected.
The New York rule has been stated not to apply to cases where
the attorney "has changed his position or incurred expense" or "is
"employed under a general retaining fee for a fixed period to perform
"legal services." It is submitted that the first exception is useless and
should be forgotten. An attorney has always changed his position by
merely accepting the employment, since he cannot thereafter be
employed on the opposite side. The second exception, a contract for
a fixed period, seems to be generally approved2 9 and has recently been
followed by the New York Court of Appeals in Greenburg v. Remick
'He explained his high charge for the trial on the ground of the ignominy
his appearing in defense of such a crime might bring on himself. But he
had already appeared at the preliminary hearing for the smaller sum.
H See citations in (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 82.
' Note 2, supra.
Cohen, op. cit. note 21, at p. 207. See also note 2, supra.
"Horn V. Western Land Assn. (875) 22 Minn. 233; Dixon v. Volunteer
Bank, supra note i2; cases collected L. R. A. 1917 E. 4o6, note.
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& Co. (1926, N. Y.) 129 N. E. 211, reversing the judgment of
the appellate division o which had sustained a demurrer to an attorney's
complaint for breach of contract for yearly employment. 1 Logically
the case is similar to that of employment for a particular case, but
practically the reasons of- policy are not so strong. Both parties are
able in advance to make a fairer estimate of the value of the services
for the fixed period than is possible where the amount of services to
be rendered is wholly indefinite, and one who has sufficient law business
to employ an attorney regularly is probably sufficiently informed as
to its character to avoid imposition. It would not have been undesir-
able for the court to assume control of this class of fees, though in
view of the difference in situation, probably it cannot reasonably be
criticised for failure to do so.
It is obvious that one's answer to the questions here involved will
turn upon the background of his own experience and the point of
view with which he approaches the problem. If his experience has
been (as it is suggested is the more general experience) that compara-
tively few clients are able to impose upon lawyers, while unfortunately
the converse is not true, his views will accord with those expressed in
Martin v. Camp. And they will be more strongly fortified if his point
of view is not that of the lawyer trying to make a living, but is that
of one seeking the general welfare of the community, which needs
urgently men of exceptional character as its "officers of the court."
It is unfortunate that such welfare may not coincide with the needs of
the young man with his way to make. Perhaps to some the answer
may seem harsh, but it is nevertheless sound that unless he wishes to
accommodate himself, to the high standards of the profession necessary
to the general welfare, he should employ his time and talents in other
fields.3 2  C.E.- C.
(192o) 191 App. Div. 947, i82 N. Y. Supp. 229.
"The court repeats the unfortunate statement in Martin v. Camp, supra
note 6, that "the right to discharge" the attorney is an implied condition of the
contract, and then adds, "unless expressly or otherwise negatived." This
last is against all authority, particularly in New York. See notes 16 and 18,
supra. The implication is one of law, not of fact. This shows the danger
of failing to recognize that an implication or presumption of law means simply
that whatever is to be so implied or presumed-here the fact of an agreement
-is no longer a necessary operative fact in the legal situation under considera-
tion. Cf. (i92o) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 921.
"Cf. Cohen, op. cit. note 21, at p. 214.
